Introduction
Advances in technology in recent years have been accompanied by an increasing number of hazards and failures. Risk has therefore become an issue of growing concern [1] . This article reviews the literature on risk from a systems perspective.
Systems thinking is characterized by its holistic approach to problem solving while analytical methods used in risk assessment can be viewed mainly as reductionist.
Although there is little agreement over a definition of "risk" the notion of probability is central to all risk assessment techniques identified in the literature, although the interpretation of probability depends on whether it is viewed objectively or subjectively.
First the most cited methods for managing risk together with other related theories will be critically examined. The concepts used will then be classified according to their systemic properties. Finally a "systems approach to failure" [2] will be briefly described and it is suggested that the use of this method could provide the risk manager with a valuable tool.
The analytical method
The concept of analysis is usually understood to be a three-stage process, namely:
(1) taking apart the thing to be understood; (2) trying to understand the behaviour of the parts taken separately; and (3) trying to assemble this understanding into an understanding of the whole [3] .
This mechanistic and reductionist approach to problem solving underpins most risk assessment methods. However, as history has shown, failures continue to occur, arising mostly from increasingly complex "ill structured" socio-technical systems.
Systems thinking
In recent years "systems thinking" has developed as an alternative to mechanistic thinking [4] . This approach is based on four ideas as characteristics of systems [5] . They are:
(1) emergence; (2) hierarchy; (3) communication; and (4) control. Checkland defines a system as: a set of elements connected together which form a whole, this showing properties which are properties of the whole, rather than properties of its component parts [5, p. 3] . This is a holistic approach, which tackles problems by examining the context of the system in which they occur [6] and is particularly relevant to tackling illstructured "messy" problems.
The process of risk assessment
The concept of probability is fundamental to the assessment of risk, and the use of statistical databases has become a prerequisite.
A review of the literature suggests that the process of risk assessment is usually broken down into three stages:
(1) risk identification; (2) risk estimation; and (3) risk evaluation as shown in Figure 1 .
Numerous techniques and concepts used in risk assessment have been identified in the literature. There follows a critical discussion on the most cited methods.
Techniques and concepts used in risk assessment
Failure mode and effects analysis Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is essentially a systematic brainstorming session aimed at finding out what could go wrong with a system or process [7] . To be effective it requires expertise and sound prior knowledge of the system under analysis.
The essence of the FMEA technique is to list for each system component, all possible modes of failure and the potential effect of each failure on the rest of the system. Results are usually presented in the form of a table. The most common headings used [8] q Severity. The likelihood of each failure mode can then be classified in terms of a probabilistic value by the use of four severity classes and five levels [8] as outlined below.
(1) Severity: q catastrophic; q critical; q marginal; and q negligible.
(2) Levels: q frequent; q reasonably probable; q occasional; q remote; and q extremely unlikely. The concept behind an FMEA is to render the system capable of being analysed by breaking it down into its component parts. However, most systems are so complex that analysts resort to limiting the number of failure modes for a component or restricting the types of risks to be considered. This implies that not all risks a system might face will be discovered [9] .
The analysis of each component is usually carried out in isolation, since if combinations were considered the task would become intractable. This means that specific combinations of events or component failures which may cause a system failure could be overlooked [10] .
An FMEA relies on the correctness of the technology or science on which the model is built. Only perceived possible risks can be guarded against and operator errors are seldom considered.
Important qualitative insights can be gained by using this technique. However an FMEA is a reductionist procedure which fails to identify interactive combinations of equipment failures or common cause failures.
Fault tree analysis and event tree analysis
Fault tree analysis (FTA) and event tree analysis (ETA) are a systematic method for encouraging analysts to consider how a particular condition could arise or what may ensue from a particular event, hence allowing causes or outcomes of undesired events to be identified [7, 11] . However, for the method to be effective, analysts need to have a thorough understanding of the system under consideration, the cause-effect process [12] and all possible failure modes [13] . This graphical technique uses logic diagrams for identifying causes (FTA) or consequences (ETA) of potential failures [10] . Event trees move forward from an initiating event to show accident sequences (see Figure 2) . Fault trees start from a postulated failure and move backwards to show all possible causes (see Figure 3) .
Although designed to give qualitative insights, sequences can be quantified to allow probabilities of events (or chains of events) to be obtained [14] .
Failures very seldom have a single cause. Often chains of events combine to produce a disaster. However, the approach assumes that each branch of a tree involves mutually exclusive events which are independent of one another. The method therefore fails to identify common mode or common cause failures [10, 15] Figure 1 . The process of risk assessment also unsuitable for handling partial failures, and time delays [10, 12] . Fault and event trees by their nature include a large component of judgement. Analysts using the technique must determine the structure of the problem and the importance of the various branches. In a study in which participants were asked to judge the completeness of a tree, respondents failed to detect "pruned" branches [16, 17] .
Fault and event trees are simplified models of systems which can yield valuable information on process logic. Because the models are once again reductionist, emergent properties arising from the whole system would not be recognized.
Hazard and operability study A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is a brainstorming technique using guide words like "none", "more of", "less of", "other" to identify risks. The method was developed to discover hazards and operability problems during the design or redesign of systems [18] . It is mainly used in the oil and chemical industries, where the technique is applied to line diagrams, line-by-line [19] .
HAZOP assumes analysts have a complete and detailed knowledge of the system and procedures; it is therefore not suitable for bringing fresh minds to look at a design [18] . Its most serious shortcoming is its failure to anticipate human errors [19] . Because components are considered one by one, interdependence between elements may be missed, and whole system properties would fail to be detected.
Cost benefit analysis and risk-benefit analysis
One of the best developed techniques for risk assessment is cost-benefit analysis (CBA) [20] . This technique is used for estimating and quantifying risk. The basic premiss is that alternatives can be selected by systematically comparing the advantages and disadvantages which would result from the estimated consequences of a choice. CBA therefore presumes that there are alternative options available [21] .
The technique involves compiling a balance sheet of expected benefits against expected costs or adverse consequences. Each benefit and consequence is given a monetary value (taking the probability of each condition into account).
The efficiency criterion underlying CBA is a potential Pareto improvement, that "a decision is an improvement if those who are better off could potentially share some of their gains with those who are worse off in such a way that everyone would be better off. It does not however require that such compensation actually be made" [22, p. 189] . The basic decision criterion function used is net present value.
One of the main difficulties with CBA is assigning a monetary value to life. Several procedures are cited, ranging from the estimated present value of an individual's projected earnings (now recognized as inappropriate), deriving the value of a life from compensation damages awarded by juries, to valuation procedures based on an individual's willingness to pay for some statistical reduction in the risk of death [22] .
The concept underpinning risk benefit analysis (RBA) is that the expected benefits from a proposed technology or activity are balanced against the expected risks [23] . As risks cannot readily be reduced to monetary terms the analysis usually takes the form of a comparison of benefits with injury or fatality rates. The method assumes that individuals are prepared to undertake increasing risks (up to a certain level) provided the benefits increase proportionately [24] . To be effective voluntary and involuntary categories of risk must be kept apart when using this procedure [25] .
There are many limitations to CBA and RBA, including:
q adverse conditions are assumed in advance [23] ;
q data on "probability of occurrence" is required; Figure 3 . Basic form of fault tree q decisions are often based on value judgements; q prejudiced analysts may push their calculations in the direction of a predetermined outcome [26] ;
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q implications of human error are not included [27] ; q uncertainties are given little explicit attention; q the contexts in which the risks are placed are not considered [28] . Although CBA and RBA are useful tools for quantifying risk they cannot be described as holistic techniques because amongst other things they fail to consider context, uncertainty and the implications of human error.
Human reliability analysis
Human reliability analysis (HRA) is a procedure for identifying events where human interaction could contribute to a potential failure. These events can then be quantified with a ranking based on risk. A large number of techniques are cited in the literature; early methods include THERP (The Human Error Rate Procedure), Data Store (a data bank of performance data on the use of common controls and displays) and Siegel's Simulation (a computer model of tasks) [29] .
More recent approaches can be divided into probability models TESEO (tecnica empirica stima errori operatori), techniques based on time-reliability relationships OATS (operator action trees), HCR (human cognitive reliability), techniques based on human judgements (Confusion Matrix, SLIM (success likelihood index methodology), SCHEMA (system for critical human error management and assessment), APJ (absolute probability judgement)) and influence diagramming techniques STAHR (sociotechnical assessments of human reliability) [30] .
THERP is probably the most well known and widely used technique [30] . It has been modified and updated over the past decade. The technique involves the decomposition of tasks into elements and the use of binary logic diagrams in which the limbs represent decision points (correct or incorrect performance), the probability of each outcome being combined with "performance shaping factors" (type of equipment used, stress, proficiency etc.). Probability values are contained in tables and databases in which tasks are decomposed into their component parts. Steps in a THERP analysis are shown diagrammatically in Figure 4 [30] .
THERP makes the basic assumption that human functions can be considered in the same way as other components, that is functions are decomposed into task elements which can be handled separately. A further assumption is that the performance of one task has an effect on the performance of concurrent or subsequent tasks [29] and that there are adequate databases of tasks and error probabilities [10] .
THERP suffers from the following limitations:
q it is difficult to represent the variability of human behaviour adequately;
q the technique assumes each task segment can be handled separately;
q it is difficult to combine human and equipment reliability values;
q it is difficult to identify inter-task dependencies; q the technique is not appropriate for continuous tasks;
q the method does not determine motivation of the individual;
q analysts have a tendency to model only errors that appear in databases [30] . Any decompositional approach to analysing human error (of which THERP is a well-established example) is based on reductionist principles and would therefore fail to detect failures of a systemic nature.
Risk perception techniques
During the evaluation stage of risk assessment, acceptability of the risk must be considered. Several techniques for measuring people's attitude to risk have evolved:
q The revealed preferences technique uses historical data on past behaviours in relation to risk to establish future choices. This approach therefore assumes that through trial and error society has arrived at a near optimal and acceptable balance between risk and benefits associated with any activity [23] . The approach fails to consider how time might change what society finds acceptable.
q The expressed preferences approach evaluates perceived risks through direct measurement. The amount of agreement or consensus that prevails over an issue is assessed by the use of surveys [23] . This technique assumes that respondents will always act in the way they say they will on questionnaires when actually faced with a hazardous situation. q The Delphi method is a procedure for aggregating expert opinions. The technique is characterized by the use of questionnaires which are completed independently by each member of a panel of experts. These are then circulated anonymously between the panel along with rationales and reasons for each opinion. The process is repeated several times and usually produces some convergence of opinion [33] .
Risk perception can be viewed from two perspectives:
(1) The "expected utility" view assumes that humans take decisions to maximize their profit or other preferred advantage and that all alternatives and consequences are known.
(2) The "bounded rationality" view recognizes that it is not possible for humans to know or reliably assess all alternative options when faced with a complex situation, therefore decisions are made using the satisficing method.
Risk means different things to different people because each person holds a unique view of the world. All individual perceptions of risk can be regarded as equally valid [34] .
Sensitivity analysis Sensitivity analysis (SA) is used to indicate the robustness of the overall results of an analysis.
This procedure is usually based on a spreadsheet model and involves a series of "what if?" questions by giving a percentage change to each key parameter one at a time so that significant and insignificant variables can be identified [35] .
The technique is constrained by time, effort and imagination, which leads to systematic over-simplification of problems and exclusion of many considerations. The method cannot do justice to profound moral questions posed by many decisions [36] .
Hertz-type simulation
This technique uses a computer simulation to model a situation where a number of key variables which impinge on a situation could vary simultaneously. The model generates a probability distribution based on the various combinations [37] .
Monte Carlo simulation
The Monte Carlo technique can be used to reduce probability variance. Probability distributions of relevant input variables are fed into a computer and a simulation program selects values for each variable on the basis of their relative likelihood of occurrence [33] .
Expert systems
Expert systems are computer models which use artificial intelligence to emulate the reasoning process of an expert. The knowledge base includes data and rules which must always be kept up to date [18] . The computer can be interrogated (using a standard dialogue system) much as one would approach a human expert [8] .
However, expert opinions suffer from the following weaknesses:
q experts may differ in their judgement of safety [25] ; q experts could be influenced by political power [38] ;
q empirical data suggests that experts and lay people have quite different perceptions about the riskiness of various technologies [16] ;
q expert assessments are susceptible to bias [16] ;
q it is difficult to transplant a deduction from one context to another.
Expert systems usually present information in a simplified, unidimensional format. This often hides the complexity of the subject-matter under consideration [39] .
Other decision analysis techniques
Numerous computer models and databases are available which provide probabilistic data and other information on which to base decisions. DENZ (a program developed to calculate the dispersion of gases from instantaneous releases) and CRUNCH (a program to calculate the dispersion of gases from continuous releases) are computer models which can be used to predict the behaviour of dense gases from instantaneous (DENZ) or continuous (CRUNCH) releases. GASP models the spread of a pool of refrigerated liquid [7] . Data on events such as fires, explosions and toxic gas releases can be extracted from MHIDAS (Major Hazards Incident Database) [7, 18] . Dow Index and Mond Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index can be used to give a quantitative indication of the relative potential of a hazardous incident associated with a given process [7, 40] .
Databases are useful for stimulating thought and enquiry but do not produce a broad ranging or deep enough consideration of what could go wrong [7] and quantitative models are unable to capture holistic or qualitative elements of a problem [22] .
Risk assessment and use of techniques
Most techniques identified are used across the risk assessment process as shown in Figure 5 .
Probability and perspectives
The concept of probability can be viewed from two perspectives. The objective classical approach sees risk as a measurable property of the physical world, therefore a risk assessment carried out by an analyst who adopts the objective perspective will use methods based on the classical theory of probability and statistics [33] . This view assumes probabilities to be real properties of real physical systems and requires the value of variables to be drawn solely from available data.
On the other hand, the subjective Bayesian perspective sees risk as a product of perceptions. A risk assessment carried from this perspective will adopt the view of probability often associated with the eighteenth-century mathematician Thomas Bayes, that is "probability is a number expressing a state of knowledge or degree of belief that depends on the information, experience and theories of the individual who assigns it" [33, p. 209] . This approach therefore requires information (about likely parameter values) that is unrelated to the available data.
Results of an assessment using the classical view depend on a good fit between basic maths concepts and the "real world". This means that practical situations are often tailored to fit the mathematical models. Results obtained using a subjective perspective will vary depending on the state of information and the analysts' assumptions; different analysts often arrive at different answers to the same problem [12] .
Therefore the outcome of a risk assessment is dependent on the approach used and the analyst's world view.
Related concepts and theories

Common mode and common cause failures
The literature suggests there is no entirely acceptable method for dealing with failures caused by outside influences, component weaknesses or a cascade effect.
A procedure for examining physical, environmental and procedural interconnection between systems and their components has been suggested by Bell [10] . However, the method cannot guarantee anticipating every interaction or combination of primary events.
Root cause analysis
This is an investigative procedure using a total system approach to investigate causes of accidents. The method involves working back from an accident to consider all possible causes by using the key word "why?".
Root cause analysis recognizes that accidents are defects in the total system, that people are only part of the system and assumes multiple causes for accidents [41] .
Cultural theory
The cultural theory of risk is based on the pioneering work of Douglas and Wildavsky [42] who advanced the notion that the selection of risk was value laden and culturally constructed and reflected moral, political, economic and power positions [23] . This hypothesis suggests that risk is socially constructed, that is individuals choose between risk-avoiding or riskaccepting strategies guided by their culture and social context [43] .
Further work on the theory by Adams [44] links risktaking decisions with four distinctive world views:
(1) the fatalist; (2) the hierarchist; (3) the individualist; and (4) the egalitarian. These views act as filters through which the world is perceived and through which risk-assessment decisions are made [43] . Therefore the successful management of risk depends on the cultural and social context in which the risk is placed [45] . This is a holistic view of risk that recognizes that every person has their own individual view of the world, and this view will influence how they behave.
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Risk homeostasis theory
The theory of risk homeostasis was proposed by Wilde [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] . The theory suggests that accidents are a result of behaviour which attempts to balance an accepted target level of risk against perceived risk, that is, if the level of subjective risk perceived is higher or lower than the level of risk desired, an individual will take action to eliminate this discrepancy [46] . This theory has caused widespread debate. Many articles refute the hypothesis [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] , although experiments have been done which support the theory [56] . Others believe the theory is untestable [57] [58] [59] . It is possible that the theory has been rejected because, if it is proved to be correct, many safety measures would be rendered pointless. However, the risk homeostasis theory has had the "important effect of bringing to the forefront the fact that behaviour is not necessarily a constant and that behaviour modification has important implications for safety" [60, p. 1540] .
Risk compensation theory
The risk compensation theory has evolved from the risk homeostasis theory. This theory proposes that when individuals balance their target level of risk against perceived risks, partial compensation rather than complete homeostasis takes place.
Adams has developed a model of the theory. This assumes that "individual risk-taking decisions represent a balancing act in which perceptions of risk are weighed against propensity to take risks" [44, p. 15] . This is shown diagrammatically below in Figure 6 .
This theory has many advocates, including Underwood et al. [61] , Asch et al. [62] , Janssen [63] , Adams [44, [64] [65] [66] , Mathew [67] , Davis [68] and Hakamies-Blomqvist [69] . Indeed, many researchers now view risk compensation as a normal part of everyday behaviour [70] . A recent report by a scientific group of experts from 16 counties examined the evidence for risk compensation and concluded that controversy now centred "on the interpretation of what causes it, and how complete it is, not on whether it occurs" [71, p. 55] . However others suggest there is weak [72] or conflicting evidence for the theory [73] [74] [75] .
Risk compensation encourages risk to be viewed as an interactive phenomenon, one person's behaviour has consequences for others, it reinforces the view that people respond to risk from a subjective perspective.
Classification of techniques and concepts identified in the literature
Most of the techniques identified in the literature assess risk by dividing systems into their component parts and considering each part separately. This is an important step in identifying failures as it ensures that the elements are all functioning correctly. However, it is at the assembly stage that this reductionist view breaks down because of its failure to identify emergent properties arising from interacting elements and because it does not consider that the behaviour of systems is due as much to their external environment as to their internal mechanisms.
By contrast many of the related theories take a more holistic view. The following diagram (see Figure 7) locates the techniques and concepts in a two-axis framework which distinguished between holistic and reductionist approaches and between frequent and infrequent use.
A systems approach to failures
The framework illustrated in Figure 7 suggests the most frequently used approaches for managing risk are reductionist in nature. This approach to problem solving is characterized by a downward movement which reduces the problem into smaller and smaller parts.
This can be contrasted with some of the less used concepts which take a more holistic view of risk. This view considers the system as a whole, and is characterized by an upward movement which tackles problems by investigating the system's environment. A systems approach simplifies by taking "multiple partial views of reality"[6, p. 98] (rather like a CAT Scan), these views are then built up into a complete representation of the whole. Table I illustrates the difference between the views.
The failures method
The failures method was developed as a way of using systems thinking and systems concepts to study failure. It is a holistic approach which aims to describe a failure and explain why it occurred.
Briefly, the method involves representing the failure situation as a system, comparing this model with a model of a system that is capable of purposeful activity without failure (the formal system model [5, p. 175] ). Based on the outcome of this first comparison further models (known as paradigms) are selected and used to examine appropriate aspects of the situation. Iteration is an essential component of the approach [2] . This is shown in Figure 8 .
The formal system model lies at the heart of most systems concepts. It is shown diagrammatically in Figure 9 .
Further paradigms used in the method include [ The approach has been widely used as an aid to understanding failures, and in quality management [77] . Some of the paradigms used in the method mirror techniques used in risk analysis. It is therefore suggested that the failures method could be incorporated into the risk assessment process.
Conclusion
A review of the literature on risk has revealed many techniques and concepts for identifying, evaluating and estimating risks. Most approaches are based on the concept of "divide and conquer". This view has several benefits. It provides a formal structure for collating expertise on different aspects of the problem; it makes explicit the rationale used in reasoning; and it facilitates constructive criticism [22] .
However, this reductionist principle fails to consider that accidents and failures are "emergent properties" arising out of "whole systems". That is it fails to consider how different parts of a system interact and it underestimates environmental effects.
Concepts and theories which do not appear to be currently used for risk assessment have also been identified. Many of these ideas appear to be more holistic in that they consider how human behaviour and context can affect the management of risk.
Risk managers face situations that can be described as "ill-structured messes" [78] , arising from complex sociotechnical systems. Systems methodologies have been developed to deal with precisely these sort of problems [78] .
One such method is the failures method, which reflects many of the techniques used in risk assessment. It is therefore suggested that the use of systems ideas and the failures method in particular could be a valuable risk management tool. 
